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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Second
District Court, and the appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court.
(Order Transferring Appeal, R. 1192.)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, dismissing Mr.

Johnson's claims for negligence against the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT")
for injuries Mr. Johnson suffered while driving on Interstate 15 during a repair and
reconstruction project in Layton, Utah.

(Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant UDOT's

Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 862-962 (hereafter f,Opp. Mem.,f).)
This issue involves four sub-issues:
a.

Whether and to what extent Mr. Johnson's claims are barred by the negligent

inspection exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(4). (Opp. Mem., R. 876.)
b.

Whether UDOT is relieved of liability of its own negligence in overseeing

and managing the reconstruction project. (Opp. Mem., R. 877-878.)
c.

Whether UDOT is vicariously liable for negligence of Granite Construction,

the independent contractor UDOT hired to perform the reconstruction work. (Opp. Mem.,
R. 878-879.)
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d.

Whether and to what extent Mr. Johnson's claims are barred by the dis-

cretionary function exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-10(1). (Opp. Mem, R. 870-876.)
Standard of Review
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences are viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Mr. Johnson), and no deference is given to the
trial court's ruling. R&, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998);
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. $63-30-8:
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition
of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel,
bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(1)
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;

(4)
a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection;

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a personal injury claim by Craig Johnson against the Utah Department of
Transportation for serious injuries Mr. Johnson suffered from a dangerous condition on
Interstate 15. Mr. Johnson was injured in a vehicular accident when the left front tire of his
car fell into an open pavement cutout on the freeway during a repair and reconstruction
project. The project required several "full-depth slab replacements," in which sections of
pavement would be completely removed or "cut out," leaving large, one-foot-deep, fulllane-width gaps in the pavement. Mr. Johnson was driving in an open travel lane right next
to the cutouts, with nothing separating the travel lane from the cutouts except for some
plastic barrels. Mr. Johnson asserts that UDOT was negligent in failing to adequately
separate the pavement cutouts from the open lanes and in failing to ensure compliance with
safety measures outlined in its Traffic Control Plan, which was intended specifically to
prevent the type of accident that occurred.
Course of Proceedings
Mr. Johnson initiated this action on October 3, 1997, against UDOT and Granite
Construction Company, the contractor that performed the reconstruction work. (Complaint,
R. 1-5.) UDOT answered on November 7, 1997. (UDOT Answer, R. 29-34.) A trial was
set and continued seven times. (Trial Continuances, R. 86-87; 128; 178-180; 398-401; 501504; 547-549; 557-559.) On October 16, 2002, UDOT moved for summary judgment.
(Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 676-677.) A hearing on the motion took place on
November 19, 2002, and the court granted UDOT's motion. (Hearing Transcript, R. 1195.)
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An order dismissing Mr. Johnson's claim against UDOT was entered on January 8, 2003,
the trial court certifying the ruling as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 1157-1160, Addendum Exhibit 1 hereto.) Mr.
Johnson filed his notice of appeal on January 23, 2003. (Notice of Appeal, R. 1174-1175.)
Statement of Facts
A.

Mr. Johnson's Accident.

Craig Johnson was seriously injured on September 14, 1996, when his car's left front
tire fell into a 12- to 18-inch-deep pavement cutout which had been removed during a
highway repair and reconstruction project planned, authorized, funded, and supervised by
UDOT. (See Amended Complaint, R. 97-101.) Mr. Johnson was traveling southbound on
Interstate 15 in Layton when he encountered Project No. IM-15-7(191)332, otherwise
known as the "Layton-Clearfield Project" or the "Project." The Layton-Clearfield Project
involved removing and replacing large slabs of pavement. (Amended Complaint ^ 9-11,
R. 98-99; Memo. Supp. Def. UDOT's Motion for Summ. J. ("UDOT Memo."), R. 680.)
After Mr. Johnson's vehicle tire fell into the first cutout, which was thirty-four feet long, he
lost control of his vehicle, and rolled through two more cutouts. (Amended Complaint ^f 11,
R. 99; Deposition of Trooper Greg Lundell, R. 884.)
There was no barrier separating Mr. Johnson's lane of travel from the cutouts in the
freeway. Instead, plastic barrels were simply set up along the edge of Mr. Johnson's travel
lane, inside the cutouts. (Lundell Depo., R. 886; Photographs, R. 911-12, Addendum
Exhibit 2.) In addition to the plastic barrels, UDOT's "Traffic Control Plan" for the Project
required white striping along the edge of the travel lane and a two- or three-foot horizontal
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buffer zone between the striping and the barrels. (See Traffic Control Plan Diagrams, R.
900, 951, Add. Ex. 3; Nichols Depo., R. 903-05.) And most importantly, the Traffic
Control Plan expressly required that during Phase Four of the Project, when Mr. Johnson
was injured, only one lane of traffic was to be open during off-peak hours, including nighttime. (See Diagram.) Phase Four required slab replacement to be done in the center lane of
the freeway. Thus, under the Plan, when the pavement cutouts were in the center lane, the
adjacent lane was supposed to be closed, thus providing for another eleven feet of horizontal separation between the travel lane and the cutouts. (See id.; see also Bid Proposal,
Supplemental Specifications, Special Provisions, ^f 108.4.2.6, R. 949.)
These important aspects of the Traffic Control Plan were ignored on the night of Mr.
Johnson's accident. As explained above, the lane next to the cutouts was open to traffic,
. even though it was nighttime and the Plan required the lane to be closed. (See Lundell
Report, R. 779; Deposition of Jimmie Keyes, Granite Employee, R. 954-55.) A UDOT
field inspector had specifically authorized that lane to be open when no workers were
actually on the scene. (Keyes Depo., R. 955-56.) Moreover, the travel lanes lacked any
striping identifying the edge of the pavement, nor was there the required horizontal buffer
between the edge of the travel lane and the barrels. (Photographs, R. 910-11, Add. Ex. 2.)
Mr. Johnson suffered a fractured dislocation of the talus with a fractured talar neck
and rotation of the talar body. Mr. Johnson is permanently disabled as a result of the
accident. He suffers a midfoot cavus deformity which requires specific arch support,
special shoes, and a potential mid-foot osteotomy. (See Photographs, R. 913.)
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B.

The Original Decision to Use Plastic Barrels.

Defendant Granite Construction Company ("Granite") was the independent
contractor UDOT chose to perform the work on the Layton-Clearfield Project. The Project
involved joint repair and slab replacement on sections of Interstate 15 in Davis County,
requiring 12- to 18-inch-deep pavement cutouts.

(UDOT Memo., R. 680.)

When a

construction project involves more than a six-inch-deep cutout in the pavement, concrete
barriers are recommended by the Federal Highway Administration to protect the motoring
public. (FHA Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and Maintenance Work Zones, R. 957-958, Add. Ex. 4; Deposition of Phil Paskett, UDOT Traffic
Control Inspector, R. 917-918.) Indeed, UDOT had used concrete barriers on similar
projects in the past. (Lundell Depo. R. 887; Deposition of Chuck Lindsay, Granite Project
Engineer, R. 744.) Yet UDOT did not use the recommended concrete barriers on the
Layton-Clearfield Project. (Lundell Depo., R. 883; Photographs, R. 911-12, Add. Ex. 2.)
Instead, UDOT used plastic barrels as the only means of separating the motoring
public from the cutouts. (UDOT Memo., R. 680, ^ 2; Traffic Control Plan Diagrams, R.
900, 951, Add. Ex. 3.) UDOT was unableE5 identify who designed the Traffic Control Plan
or who recommended the plastic barrels. In fact, UDOT admits it may have been a lower
level employee. (Deposition of Dyke LeFevre, UDOT Region One Director, R. 932-34;
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (MUDOT Reply
Memo.,f),R. 1029,ffi[10-11.)
UDOT used plastic barrels on the Project because they were cheaper than concrete
barriers. (Deposition of Kevin Griffin, UDOT Field Engineer, R. 961-962; Lindsay Depo.,
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R. 744; LeFevre Depo., R. 939; Trooper Lundell Depo., R. 886.) The decision to forego the
concrete barriers was made by Dyke LeFevre, UDOT's Region One Director. Mr. LeFevre
did not discuss the decision to use plastic barrels with his superior, Mr. Clint Topham.
(LeFevre Depo., R. 932, 936-937.) Mr. LeFevre did not utilize any safety studies nor hire
an outside opinion before making the decision. (LeFevre Depo., R. 928.)
C.

The Change Order Decision

Immediately prior to commencement of the Project, Granite contacted UDOT
regarding safety concerns. (See Letter from Granite to UDOT, March 29, 1996, R. 757760.)

Granite asked UDOT to approve a "change order" allowing Granite to install

concrete barriers and reduce the speed limit to 55 mph. Granite pointed out that using
concrete barriers would improve worker and driver safety, reduce the Project's impact on
traffic because two lanes could safely be open at all times, and allow the Project to be completed sooner because the workers could work more efficiently. (Id.) Granite stated that if
the concrete barriers were used, the Project could be completed 28 days earlier. (Id.)
Granite further emphasized that regardless of UDOT's approval of the concrete barriers, the
speed limit should be reduced to 55 mph, as the Traffic Control Plan was designed with a
55 mph speed limit, which had later been raised to 65 mph.1 (Id.) The request was forwarded to Dyke LeFevre, UDOT's Region One Director, with an estimated cost increase of
$767,885.00. (Id at R. 760.)

1

At the time the traffic control plan was devised the speed limit on 1-15 was 55 mph
for the entire state. After the Federal restrictions were lifted in 1995, the speed limit was
then raised to 65 mph on several portions of 1-15, including the area subsequently included
in the Layton-Clearfield Project.
7

UDOT's project engineer, Kent Nichols, responded that Mr. LeFevre believed "the
Commission"2 would approve the change order if Granite could keep the cost at $450,000
with a "50 days time saving." (Letter from UDOT to Granite, April 2, 1996, R. 762-763.)
Granite responded that it could complete the change order for $494,832 (if UDOT supplied
certain "attenuators"), with a 28-day time savings. (See Letter from Granite to UDOT,
April 11, 1996, R. 765.) Granite's final proposal was thus less than $50,000 over UDOT's
proposal, with a 22-day difference in the completion dates. Notably, UDOT never cited any
reason other than cost for rejecting Granite's proposal. In fact, UDOT even admitted below
that Granite could have used concrete barriers for the Project at its own cost. (See UDOT
Memo., R. 6884 23.)
When a vehicle drove into a pavement cutout on July 2, 1996, soon after two Granite
employees had vacated that area to obtain more supplies, Granite renewed its change order
request for concrete barriers and a 55 mph speed limit. (See Letter from Granite to UDOT,
July 2, 1996, R. 767 ("July Request").) Granite reiterated its concern that "safety" was
being ignored because "dollars had been the guiding factor." (Id.) Granite's July letter also
sought approval to eliminate their employees' night shifts since they were having the
greatest safety concerns night. (Id.) Mr. Nichols forwarded this request to Mr. LeFevre and
Clint Topham. (Memo, from Kent Nichols to Dyke LeFevre, July 2, 1996, R. 769.) Mr.
Nichols concurred with Granite's concerns and informed his superiors that there was an

2

Presumably, Mr. Nichols was referring to the Transportation Commission. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-1-301 to -303.
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"over-whelming feeling" that safety was not being given "adequate consideration." (Id.)
Mr. Nichols reiterated the increased danger during the nighttime hours. (Id.)
Mr. LeFevre denied the July Request to reduce the speed limit and add concrete
barriers. Mr. LeFevre testified that he spoke to Mr. Topham regarding the July Request and
was told to make the decision based on the costs. (LeFevre Depo., R. 938-39.) As with the
first change order request, Mr. LeFevre did not take the July Request to the "commission."
(Id., R. 940.) There was never a written denial or explanation of the July Request. Mr.
LeFevre testified it was Mr. Nichols' responsibility to answer the July Request. (Id., R.
926.)
Mr. LeFevre did not speak with the FFIA regarding the decision to deny the change
order requests. (Id., R. 938.) No written reports or safety analysis were used in denying the
requests. (Id., R. 938, 941.) Mr. LeFevre testified he made decisions to approve or deny
change order requests every day, and that there was nothing unusual about the request in the
present case. (Id., R. 941-42.) UDOT's reason for denying the change order requests,
initiated after additional safety issues arose, was solely financial. (Griffin Depo., R. 961962; Lindsay Depo., R. 744; LeFevre Depo., R. 938-39.)
D.

Negligent Violations of the Traffic Control Plan

As noted earlier, UDOT's Traffic Control Plan was violated in several ways during
the Layton-Clearfield Project. Mr. Johnson was injured during Phase Four of the Project,
while driving during nighttime off-peak hours. Because the Layton-Clearfield Project involved deep pavement cutouts and concrete barriers were omitted, the Traffic Control Plan
called for a white solid line followed by a two-foot buffer zone prior to placement of plastic
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barrels. (Traffic Control Plan Diagram, R. 951, Add. Ex. 3; Nichols Depo., R. 903-905.)
During off-peak hours of Phase Four, the Plan additionally allowed only one lane of travel
to be open, to provide further distance between the construction cutouts and the motoring
public. (See Traffic Control Plan Diagram, R. 951, Add. Ex. 3; Traffic Control Plan
Special Provision 108.4.2.6, R. 949; Nichols Depo., R. 903-905; Paskett Depo., R. 917-918;
Keyes Depo., R. 763; Photographs, R. 910-911, Add. Ex. 2.) Indeed, Mr. LeFevre admitted
that he did not expect traffic to be allowed right next to the open cutouts under the Plan.
(LeFevre Depo., R. 1060 ("Q:

In this case, why you didn't think that was going to

applicable is the Traffic Control Plan shows you wouldn't be traveling next to an open
cutout? A: Yes.").)
Five significant violations of UDOT's Traffic Control Plan contributed to Mr.
Johnson's accident. First, the inside lane of travel was open, even though it was nighttime,
which allowed Mr. Johnson to travel right next to the cutouts on the dark freeway. (See
Lundell Report, R. 779.) Second, there was no white striping to delineate the construction
zone from the travel lane. (Photographs, R. 910-12, Add. Ex. 2.) Third, there was no
buffer zone to isolate the construction zone from Mr. Johnson's vehicle. (See id.) Fourth,
several of the plastic barrels were placed inside of the pavement cutouts, thereby channeling
Mr. Johnson's vehicle into the cutouts. (See id.) Fifth, some of the barrels were missing.
(See id.) Since there was no white striping and misplaced barrels, no boundary existed
between the inside lane and the construction zone. Mr. Johnson was traveling in the lane
which should have been closed pursuant to UDOT's TCP when he fell into the cutouts.
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UDOT personnel were overseeing the Layton-Clearfield Project daily. (See July 2
Letter from Granite to UDOT, R. 767 (noting that the Plan and driving speeds "have put our
people and UDOT employees in jeopardy every night").) When safety issues arose, such as
accidents or missing/misplaced barriers, UDOT was contacted to remedy the problem. (See
Lundell Depo., R. 883.) UDOT's project engineer, Kent Nichols, was responsible for
interpreting the Plan and implementing it in association with UDOT's field engineer, Kevin
Griffin. (LeFevre Depo., R. 925-26.) Mr. Nichols admitted, however, that he had never
worked on a slab replacement project which involved working along side of traffic prior to
this project. (Nichols Depo., R. 908.)
One of UDOT's on-site inspectors, Mr. Griffin or Mr. Paskett, instructed Granite to
open the second lane travel, in violation of UDOT's Traffic Control Plan. (Keyes Depo., R.
954-55.) The day-to-day decisions on how to implement and interpret the Plan were made
by UDOT's agents at the construction site. If Granite wanted to make any changes to Mr.
Nichols' interpretation or Mr. Griffin's implementation, the requests needed to be in writing
and approved by UDOT. (Deposition of Randy S. Hunter, Granite Project Engineer, R.
773; Paskett Depo., R. 920.) Mr. LeFevre testified that he would not have approved of
having the second lane open with no buffer zone and barrels inside the cutouts. (LeFevre
Depo.,R. 1061.)
E.

The Summary Judgment Proceeding Below

UDOT moved for summary judgment, contending that (1) UDOT's decision to
forego concrete barriers was immunized under the discretionary function provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and (2) UDOT was not liable for the violations of the
11

Traffic Control Plan that caused Mr. Johnson's injury because it was the sole responsibility
of Granite Construction, an independent contractor, to execute the construction and comply
with the Plan. (UDOT Memo, at R. 679.) In support of the first point, UDOT relied
primarily on an affidavit Mr. LeFevre signed, and asserted that Mr. LeFevre made the
decision not to use barriers after considering "several key factors." (See id. at R. 682.) In
support of its second point, UDOT did not dispute that it or Granite had been negligent;
instead, UDOT relied on the contract between itself and Granite to argue that even if UDOT
and/or Granite had been negligent in violation from the Traffic Control Plan, Granite would
be the only liable party. (See id, R. 683-84, 703-06.)
In response, Mr. Johnson disputed that the decision to forego concrete barriers was
immune from liability.

Mr. Johnson contended that that decision was an operational

decision made by Mr. LeFevre, no different from the decisions he makes every day, and
was made solely to save some money, not to advance safety. (Opp. Mem., R. 871-74.)
Regarding UDOT's liability for the violations of the Plan, Mr. Johnson did not dispute
UDOT's facts concerning the contents of the UDOT-Granite contract, but Mr. Johnson
argued that notwithstanding that contract, UDOT was liable both for its own participation in
the Project and for Granite's negligence under the peculiar risk and inherently dangerous
work doctrines. (See Oppo Mem. at R. 877-79.)
The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing Mr. Johnson's claims with
prejudice. (Order, Add. Ex. 1.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's order granting summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Johnson's
claim against UDOT should be reversed. Mr. Johnson's complaint alleges that UDOT is
liable for numerous negligent acts, both its own and Granite's. And UDOT did not controvert those allegations. Instead, UDOT claimed that it was relieved of liability under the
Governmental Immunity Act and common law negligence doctrine.
UDOT is simply wrong. First, neither the Act nor the common law excuses UDOT
from liability for authorizing Granite to open the second lane of travel during Phase Four of
the project. By authorizing this lane to be open, UDOT created a dangerous situation by
having traffic driving on a dark freeway, right next to the dangerous cutouts, with nothing
separating the cars from the cutouts. This is exactly why Mr. Johnson was injured.
UDOT claimed below that the negligent inspection exception to the Act's waiver of
immunity barred Mr. Johnson's claim, but that doctrine clearly does not apply.

Mr.

Johnson's claim is clearly not based on negligent "inspection," but on negligently authorizing the lane to be open in violation of its own Plan. Further, recent case law from the
Utah Supreme Court and this Court establishes that the negligent inspection doctrine applies
only to regulatory or quasi-regulatory inspections of third parties, not to a governmental
entity's "inspection" of its own property to find and remedy dangerous conditions.
Similarly, UDOT's contract with Granite Construction does not relieve UDOT of
liability to Mr. Johnson. As the entity statutorily responsible for Interstate 15, UDOT had a
duty to take reasonable steps during the Project to keep that freeway reasonably safe. Even
though the contract required Granite to do the actual repair and replacement work, UDOT
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retained a measure of control over Granite, particularly with respect to Granite's execution
of the Traffic Control Plan, and UDOT had a duty to reasonably use that power to keep the
freeway safe. And UDOT had a nondelegable duty to the public to keep the freeway
reasonably safe, and as such UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence in carrying
out the work. Indeed, section 418 of the Restatement of Torts expressly recognizes that a
highway authority is vicariously liable for a contractor's negligence during a reconstruction
project, and that provision controls here.
In addition to being liable for authorizing the second lane to be open, UDOT is also
not relieved from liability for the other negligent departures from the its Plan, including
failure to provide striping to denote the edge of the safe lane of travel, failing to provide a
buffer zone, and failure to ensure that all the barrels were in place. Once again, these are
not merely matters of "inspection" under the Act, and UDOT is liable both for its own
negligence and for Granite's negligence under the retained control and nondelegable duty
doctrines.
Finally, the discretionary function exception does not immunize UDOT from liability
for its failure to use a concrete barrier to separate the freeway traffic from the cutouts.
UDOT claims that the decision was made after considering "several key factors," but a jury
could easily infer that the only reason UDOT did not use concrete barriers was to save
money. Simply because UDOT selected a dangerous alternative that was cheaper than the
recommended procedure, at the expense of public safety, does not mean as a matter of law
that a governmental entity is immune from liability. If this were the law, every negligent act
by a governmental entity would be immune. Safety features almost always cost some
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money, for private entities as well as for the government, and there is no evidence in the
record suggesting that the amount of money required in the present case would have
impacted UDOT's operations or otherwise required a "governmental" choice.

Further,

UDOT did not establish that Mr. LeFevre acted at the immunized policy-making level,
which is also required for the discretionary function exception to apply.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. JOHNSON'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST UDOT.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only if the
moving party establishes "[1] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [2]
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). to
obtain summary judgment, the moving party must submit sufficient evidence or otherwise
establish its right to judgment. The movant has an "affirmative burden," Lamb v. B & B
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993), and if the movant fails to demonstrate
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion must be denied. E.g., Badger v.
Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (because moving party's affidavit
failed to negate existence of disputed issue of fact, nonmoving party had no burden to
present evidence in response on that issue).
Mr. Johnson alleged in his Amended Complaint that UDOT is generally liable for,
inter alia, failing to provide a safe lane of traffic, failing to provide a safe zone between the
travel lane and the construction area, failing to adequately illuminate the area. (Amended
Complaint fflf 12(c), (d), (f), R. 99.) Mr. Johnson further alleges that UDOT is liable for
failure to supervise and control Granite and is vicariously liable for Granite's negligence
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because Granite was engaged in the construction of the freeway under UDOTs direction
and therefore was UDOTs agent. (Amended Complaint YH 3, 13, R. 97-99.) Further, Mr.
Johnson presented evidence below of several distinct negligent actions and omissions by
UDOT and/or Granite Construction that contributed to his accident: (1) allowing a lane of
traffic to be open right along the 12-inch-deep drop-offs at night on the unlighted freeway;
(2) failing to provide striping at the edge of the travel lane along the drop-offs; (3) failing to
provide a two-foot buffer between the travel lane and the drop-off; (4) allowing the plastic
marker barrels to be placed inside the drop-off instead of on the surface; (5) failing to
ensure that all barrels were properly in place, and (6) failing to use a concrete barrier to
separate the freeway driving traffic from the drop-offs. Accordingly, UDOT is not entitled
to summary judgment unless UDOT establishes as a matter of law that it is immune from
liability for all of these acts or omissions. UDOT did not make this showing below and
cannot do so here.
A.

UDOT is liable for the injuries Mr. Johnson suffered as a result of UDOTfs
allowing a lane of traffic to be open next to the 12-inch deep cutouts at night.
The Traffic Control Plan allowed only one lane to be open for off-peak hours during

Phase Four of the Project, when full-depth slab replacement was taking place in the center
lane of the freeway. (Traffic Control Plan Diagram, R. 951, Addendum Exhibit 3.) Under
the Plan, the 12-inch-deep pavement cutouts would be approximately eleven feet from the
travel lane. A UDOT on-site inspector, however, authorized or directed Granite Construction to open a second lane of travel, thus bringing traffic driving at freeway speeds
within inches of the cutouts. (See Keyes Depo., R. 954-55.)
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In its motion below, UDOT did not controvert Mr. Johnson's allegations in this
regard. In fact, UDOT did not dispute (for purposes of the motion) that "UDOT's field
engineer or inspector gave Granite authority to open two lanes of traffic during off-peak
hours if there were no workers in that part of the construction zone." (UDOT Reply Memo.
at R. 1031.) Instead, UDOT claimed that it was not liable because (1) the negligent
inspection provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act shielded it from liability, and (2)
its contract with Granite required that Granite perform all of the work on the Project. Both
arguments fail.
1.

The "negligent inspection" exception to the Act's waiver of immunity
does not shield UDOT from liability.

The "negligent inspection" exception to the Act's waiver of immunity states that a
governmental entity is not liable for "a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4). That provision does
not apply to Mr. Johnson's claims, however.
First, Mr. Johnson's claim is not based on UDOT's failure to "inspect" the construction work, or for an "inadequate or negligent inspection" as required for immunity
under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4). Rather, as noted above, Mr. Johnson's claim is based
on UDOT's negligently authorizing the second lane of traffic to be open, in violation of its
own Plan. That negligent act, which has nothing to do with "inspection," is enough to
subject UDOT to liability. Mr. Johnson's claim is also based on UDOT's failure to do
anything about the dangerous condition of the highway, i.e., the fact that traffic was being
allowed to drive at freeway speeds right along the edge of the cutouts.
"inspection" has little, if anything, to do with Mr. Johnson's claim.
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In short,

Second, even if the claim were construed as one for inadequate "oversight" of the
Project, the negligent inspection exception still would not allow UDOT to escape liability,
because that provision simply does not apply to a governmental entity's failure to ensure the
safety of its own property. See Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993);
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270-71 (Utah 1995); Ilott v. University of
Utah, 2000 UT App 286,1fl[6-16, 12 P.3d 1011. These cases establish that the negligent
inspection exception applies to regulatory inspections of property belonging to third parties,
such as building inspections, and not to instances in which a government employee
"inspects" the entity's own property to ensure the safety of that property.
In Ericksen, the court questioned whether the negligent inspection exception would
apply because the negligent city employee "served as an inspector for the City as the owner
of the property and as a party to the construction contract. He functioned differently from a
city inspector who inspects construction on private property for compliance with building,
fire, electric, and other safety codes!' Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 997-98 (emphasis added).
Ericksen was ultimately decided on other grounds, but in Nixon, the Utah Supreme Court
expressly held that the exception did not immunize Salt Lake City from liability for
negligently failing to maintain its own equipment, explaining that "the actions at issue here
were not an inspection." Nixon, 898 P.2d at 270-71. Finally, in Ilott, this court held that the
negligent inspection doctrine did not immunize the University of Utah from liability for
negligently "inspecting" its own stadium bleachers for defects:
Obviously, this case is different: The University crew was employed by the
University to maintain University property. The University has not
mentioned the need to inspect for compliance with safety codes and was not
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engaging in a "regulatory activity" when its crew inspected the bleachers for
defects.
I A l 14.
Ericksen, Nixon, and Ilott unquestionably defeat UDOT's suggestion that the
negligent inspection exception immunizes it from liability. 1-15 was UDOT's own property,
not the property of a third party.3 UDOT therefore cannot escape liability by relying on
Section 63-30-10(4).
2.

UDOT cannot escape liability for Mr. Johnson's injuries merely
because it hired Granite Construction to perform the actual
construction work.
a.

UDOT is directly liable for its own negligence in failing to
ensure that 1-15 was safe during the Project.

In addition to claiming immunity under the negligent inspection exception, UDOT
also attempted to avoid liability by claiming that Granite Construction was solely responsible for the safety of the freeway during the Project. The only evidence UDOT submitted
on this point was the contract between itself and Granite. This, however, is not enough to
establish UDOT's right to judgment as a matter of law.
First, UDOT cited no authority below holding that a landowner's contract with a
third party could somehow eliminate the landowner's duty to the public to provide safe
property. Tort duties are imposed by law for the benefit of foreseeable victims of a defendant's negligence. As such, a defendant subject to such a duty cannot escape that duty merely

3

Also, applying the negligent inspection exception here would effectively nullify
the Act's waivers of immunity for unsafe highways and dangerous structures, as practically
any injury resulting from an unreasonably dangerous highway or public building could be
characterized as being caused, at least in part, by a governmental entity's failure to properly
"inspect" the highway or building. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-8 and -9.
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because a third party agrees to it. Put another way, if A has a duty to the public, he or she
cannot make that duty disappear simply by entering into an agreement with B. Thus, the
terms of the contract between UDOT and Granite cannot eviscerate UDOT's duty to Mr.
Johnson to provide a safe roadway.
Second, as alluded to above, Mr. Johnson's claim against UDOT is not based merely
on UDOT's passively negligent failure to correct a hazard caused by Granite. Instead, Mr.
Johnson also claims that his injuries were caused by UDOT's own active negligence in
expressly authorizing the second lane to be opened in violation of the Plan. Before the trial
court, UDOT cited nothing in the UDOT-Granite contract providing that UDOT would not
be liable to the public for its own actions. (See UDOT-Granite Contract Provisions, R. 72122.) Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that any such provision would exist, and even if it did,
it would likely violate public policy. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 (construction contract
may not indemnify party against its own negligence).
Third, UDOT undeniably has a duty to Mr. Johnson and the rest of the driving public
to provide a safe roadway, and there is no reason to believe that this duty disappears while a
contractor is working on part of that roadway. UDOT, as the entity responsible for 1-15,
had a duty to provide a roadway that was safe for travel. See, e.g., Rollow v. Ogden City,
66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791, 794-95 (1926) ("[I]n maintaining the public streets and highways
within the limits of such cities and towns a positive legal duty is imposed to maintain them
in a reasonably safe condition for travel.") (emphasis added). In fact, the Utah Code
expressly provides that UDOT shall provide "safe" transportation systems, and when
UDOT closes part of a road for construction, UDOT "shall cause suitable barriers and
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notices to be posted and maintained." Utah Code Ann. §§72-1-201(4), 72-6-114(2)
(emphasis added).

UDOT's duty applies during a construction project, regardless of

whether the project is being undertaken by an independent contractor. See, e.g., 39 Am.
Jur. 2d, Highways, Streets & Bridges § 392, at 882 (1999) (,f[T]he duty of the public
authority to keep its highways reasonably safe for travel is not abrogated or suspended by
reason of the fact that a third person is doing construction work within the limits of the
highway, or that he is making repairs therein.") (emphasis added).
Indeed, in a related context, Utah courts have recognized that where a property
owner owes a duty to the public to use reasonable care to provide safe premises, the owner
may be liable for dangers that are caused not by the owner or its employees, but also for
dangers caused by third persons. See, e.g., Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d
476 (Utah 1996). Liability in such a situation turns on whether the owner knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about the dangerous condition, and whether
the owner acted reasonably in failing to remedy it. That reasoning applies equally in the
present situation: Because UDOT specifically authorized the opening of the second lane,
UDOT clearly knew that traffic was being allowed to drive right along the cutouts. At the
very least, UDOT should have known what was happening on 1-15 in Layton, and had a
duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that Granite complied with the Plan by keeping the
second lane closed during off-peak hours while full-depth slab replacement was taking
place on the third lane.
The "retained control" doctrine also confirms that UDOT had a duty to exercise due
care to ensure that 1-15 remained safe during the construction period. The retained control
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doctrine provides when a party retains some control over the way in which an independent
contractor performs its work, the party must exercise that control with due regard for the
safety of others:
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the
control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to
others for whose safely the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care,
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §414 (1965) (emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 5
hereto) {quoted in Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322, 327 (Utah 1999)).
In Thompson, the Utah Supreme Court formally adopted this doctrine, explaining
that one who hires an independent contractor is responsible for the contractor's work when
the principal "actively participates" in the work. Citing the Restatement, the court stated
that the doctrine applies where the principal "exert[s] such control over the means utilized
that the contractor cannot carry out the injwy-causing aspect of the work in his or her own
way" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Restatement § 414, cmt. c).
The Thompson court ultimately held that the retained control doctrine did not apply
in that case because the defendant exercised no control over the work. In Thompson, the
defendant motel owner had ordered a long narrow steel pipe, and when it was delivered she
asked the deliverymen to install the pipe vertically over a pipe stub. She then went inside,
and one of the deliverymen was injured trying to install the pipe without proper equipment.
See id. at 323-24. Except for informally asking that the pipe be installed, the defendant had
nothing to do the actual installation.
The present case, however, fits squarely within the retained control doctrine, because
UDOT exercised a great deal of control over the manner in which the reconstruction was
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done. UDOT formulated the Traffic Control Plan and expressly required Granite to comply
with that Plan in doing the work. (Granite-UDOT Contract If 107.6, R. 722.) The contract
provided that "[sjigns, barriers, barricades, lights, or other protective devices shall not be
dismantled or removed without permission of the ENGINEER"

(Id. (emphasis added).)

UDOT had employees on the site overseeing the construction, and if Granite wanted
changes made in the traffic control methods, Granite needed UDOT's permission. (See
UDOT-Granite Correspondence, R. 750-769; Deposition of Randy S. Hunter, R. 773.)
Granite thus did not have the ability to carry out the "injury-causing aspect of the work,"
i.e., the opening of the second lane during nighttime hours, in Granite's own way.
The evidence UDOT presented below was not sufficient to establish as a matter of
law that UDOT had no ability to exercise any control over Granite. A jury could reasonably
conclude that regardless of whether UDOT could direct particular workers to perform
particular tasks at particular times, UDOT clearly had the power, pursuant to its contract
with Granite Construction, to insist that Granite comply with the Traffic Control Plan.
Under the retained control doctrine, because UDOT had the power to insist that Granite
maintain 1-15 in a reasonably safe condition, UDOT had the duty to do so. Therefore,
because UDOT has not established a lack of duty as a matter of law, UDOT has not
established its right to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Johnson's claims against it for
allowing the unsafe condition of the freeway.
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b.

UDOT is vicariously liable for Granite Construction's negligence in
carrying out the work because UDOT had a nondelegable duty to
ensure a safe freeway.

Finally, even if UDOT had no direct involvement in the opening of the second lane,
and even if UDOT itself had not breached its own duty to ensure a safe roadway during the
construction, UDOT still would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because
UDOT is liable for Granite Construction's negligence under the nondelegable duty doctrine.
Under that doctrine, certain duties are important enough to public safety that those duties
cannot simply be "delegated" by an independent contractor. See 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law
of Torts § 337, at 920-21 (West 2001). Among other situations, a duty is considered
nondelegable when the work at issue involves "peculiar risks" or "special dangers." See id.
at 921; Thompson, 979 P.2d at 329.
There is no doubt that the duty to maintain highways in safe condition is nondelegable. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has long held that "[a] city is charged with the
nondelegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets and sidewalks within their
corporate limits in a reasonably safe condition." E.g., Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896,
897 (Utah 1976); accord Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). This
statement was addressed to municipalities rather than the state, but there is no reason to
think that UDOT's duty would be any more delegable than a city's. Therefore, UDOT
cannot deny liability for its failure to maintain 1-15 in a safe condition by claiming that it
delegated its duties to Granite Construction.
The Restatement of Torts affirms this conclusion. In Sections 416 through 429, the
Restatement discusses several variations and examples of the nondelegable duty doctrine,
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including the peculiar risk and inherently dangerous work doctrines discussed in Thompson
v. Jess. See Thompson, 979 P.2d at 329. These sections of the Restatement "impose
vicarious liability on the principal employer for the contractor's negligence, even if the
employer reasonably provides for precautions in the contract work."

Id (discussing

Restatement sections 416 and 427). And as one specific application of the peculiar risk
doctrine, the Restatement expressly provides that a highway authority is vicariously liable
for the negligence of an independent contractor hired to perform road construction:
One who is under a duty to construct or maintain a highway in a reasonably
safe condition for the use of the public, and who entrusts its construction,
maintenance, or repair to an independent contractor, is subject to the same
liability for physical harm to persons using the highway while it is held open
for travel during such work, caused by the negligent failure of the contractor
to make it reasonably safe for travel, as though the employer had retained the
work in its own hands.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §418(1) (emphasis added) (Addendum Exhibit 6 hereto).
See also Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625, 627-28 (Ariz. 2000) (adopting Section 418
and holding that because the contractor was acting on the city's behalf in maintaining the
streetlights, the contractor "was the City's agent for the performance of that non-delegable
duty.").
Restatement section 418 makes absolutely clear that UDOT had a nondelegable duty
under the peculiar risk doctrine. UDOT had a duty to maintain 1-15 in a reasonably safe
condition, and entrusted its repair to Granite Construction. Therefore, UDOT is liable for
injuries caused by Granite's negligence, just as if UDOT had done with its own crews.
Once again, the evidence UDOT submitted below - the contract between UDOT
and Granite - is not sufficient to establish that UDOT is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law on Mr. Johnson's claim for injuries resulting from the decision to open the second
traffic lane, thus bringing traffic right next to the slab replacement work. UDOT is liable
both for its own negligence and for Granite's negligence, and the Governmental Immunity
Act does not protect UDOT from this liability.
B.

UDOT is not immune from liability for the other violations of the Traffic
Control Plan, including the lack of striping along the work zone, the lack of a
buffer zone, the placement of the barrels inside the cutouts, and the failure to
replace missing barrels.
In addition to opening the second lane, UDOT and Granite also violated the Traffic

Control Plan by (1) failing to provide white striping along the edge of the travel lane closest
to the work zone, (2) provide a two-foot buffer between the travel lane and the work zone,
(3) placing the barrels inside the pavement cutouts, and (4) failing to replace missing
barrels.4 Mr. Johnson has a valid claim against UDOT for these actions and omissions for
the same reasons that he has a valid claim for allowing the second lane to be open. First,
the negligent inspection exception does not shield UDOT from liability because the actions
and omissions at issue do not constitute "inspections" pursuant to Section 63-30-10(4).
Second, UDOT's hiring of Granite Construction to perform the work does not relieve
UDOT from liability, as UDOT remains liable both for its own negligence and for Granite's
negligence in carrying out the construction. Because a jury could find that UDOT had the
power to ensure Granite's compliance with the Traffic Control Plan, the jury could find
that UDOT was negligent in failing to use that power to make sure that the lanes were
marked, that a buffer zone was provided, and that barrels were properly placed, all of

4

The Traffic Control Plan may have allowed for barrels to be placed inside the
cutouts, but that Plan contemplated the striping, buffer zone, and extra closed lane as well.
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which the Plan required. And the nondelegable duty doctrine as expressed in Murray v
Odgen City, Thompson v. Jess, and the Restatement of Torts applies equally to these
other violations of the Traffic Control Plan. Mr. Johnson's claims against UDOT for these
other departures from the Traffic Control Plan should therefore be reinstated.
C.

UDOT is not immune from liability for failing to require concrete barriers to
separate the freeway traffic from the work zone.
Finally, Mr. Johnson has a valid claim against UDOT for its inexcusable failure to

use concrete barriers to separate the freeway traffic from the construction zones. The trial
court dismissed this claim under the discretionary function exception, but UDOT failed to
establish as a matter of law that the failure to use barriers meets the strict requirements of
the discretionary function exception. At the very least, factual issues exist that preclude
summary judgment.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides only a limited immunity to governmental entities for injuries arising out of the exercise of discretionary functions:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(1)
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (emphasis added). Discretionary function immunity "was not
designed to cloak the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity in modern garb." Nelson v.
Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996). Instead, it is a "distinct, more limited form
of immunity that should be applied only when a plaintiff is challenging a governmental
decision that involves a basic policy-making function." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly,
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"[n]ot every governmental action involving discretion is a discretionary function within the
meaning of the Act." Truiillo v. Utah Dep't of Trans., 1999 UT App 227, ^ 21, 986 P.2d
752.

Instead, discretionary function immunity is "limited to broad policy decisions

'requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy matters, not operational and ministerial
acts!" Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, ^|28, 40 P.3d 591
(emphasis added) (quoting Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990)).
For the discretionary function exception to apply, the governmental entity must
establish that the act in question satisfies each of the following criteria:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one
which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or
objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved!
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?
Price v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2000 UT App 333, U 38, 14 P.3d 702 (emphasis
added) (quoting Truiillo f 27).
1.

UDOT failed to establish that the decisions to omit the concrete barrier
was "essential to the realization" of a basic governmental objective.

To establish that Mr. Johnson's claim against UDOT is barred under the discretionary function exception, UDOT must show that as a matter of law, using barrels
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instead of concrete barriers to separate traffic from the work zone was essential to
accomplishing a basic governmental objective:
Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that [basic governmental] policy, program, or objective
as opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the
policy, program, or objective?
Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted). UDOT's position fails
because it is patently obvious that omitting the concrete barrier was not essential to accomplishing any basic governmental goal. Instead, the decision regarding whether to use
barrels or a barrier was a decision "which would not change the course or direction of the
policy, program, or objective."
In its opening memorandum below, UDOT claimed that the discretionary function
exception applied because the present case was supposedly analogous to Keegan.

In

Keegan, the Utah Supreme Court held that discretionary immunity protected UDOTs decision not to upgrade already-existing median barriers on 1-80 in Parley's Canyon. Keegan,
896 P.2d 618. After the barriers were installed, two overlay projects raised the road level,
effectively reducing the height of the barrier, and the plaintiffs husband was killed when his
car climbed the barrier and slid into a bridge support. The court noted that UDOT had gone
through a detailed process in deciding not to raise the barrier, including a creating both a
safety study that "comprehensively]" analyzed and compared accident rates and a "costbenefit report" that addressed numerous significant factors such as the cost, the fact that the
highway was to be redone in a few years, the delays and inconvenience of an additional
construction project, and the fact that the job would be exceedingly difficult given the short
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construction season. See Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. The study and report were compiled by
senior engineers and "circulated throughout and debated within the department." Id.
Thus, in Keegan, the decision to wait to raise the median barrier was justified as
furthering the State's governmental policies of providing effective and efficient freeway
transportation.

The costs involved in such a project would have been enormous, and

upgrading the barriers would have required significant delays and disruption to persons
depending on the freeway, which of course provides the only access to Salt Lake and Davis
Counties from the east.
In contrast, the decision in the present case did not further any basic governmental
objectives. The decision certainly did not further the government's interest in providing safe
travel, because everyone has agreed all along that using barrels was significantly less safe
than using a concrete barrier. The decision did not further the government's interest in
avoiding delays, because using concrete barriers would have allowed the project to be
completed several weeks sooner; at the time, Granite stated that using barriers would allow
the work to be completed in 28 fewer days, compared to 140 days allocated originally (a
savings of twenty percent). (See Letter from Granite Construction to UDOT, March 29,
1996, R. 757-58.) And using barrels certainly did not further the governmental policy of
avoiding driver inconvenience, because using barriers would have enabled two lanes of
traffic to remain open - safely -- at all times. (See id. ("Phasing the work with precast
barriers allows for two lanes of traffic in each direction at all times.").)
The only reason UDOT chose not to use barrels was to save some money. Granite
was willing to install barriers for about $500,000, but UDOT was willing to spend only
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$450,000. (See Letter from Granite Construction to UDOT, April 11, 1996, R. 765.) In
fact, UDOT admits that if Granite were willing to pay for barriers, they could have been
used, which shows that UDOT did not really care about any of the other factors. (UDOT
Memo, at R. 688, ^f 23.) The mere fact that the more dangerous alternative was cheaper,
however, cannot be enough to immunize a governmental entity from liability, because
otherwise practically every governmental decision would be immunized.
Simply put, every safety feature costs money. For example, it would be cheaper for
a municipality to decide not to replace the brakes on any of its garbage trucks, or even to
have its employees run red lights to save time. Therefore, that a safety feature costs money
cannot in and of itself bt enough to immunize a decision not to use that feature. Otherwise,
the discretionary function exception would swallow the entire waiver of governmental
immunity, and the discretionary function exception would lose its "limited" status. Once
again, the discretionary function exception was not designed to "cloak the ancient doctrine
of sovereign immunity in modern garb." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d at 575.
Mr. Johnson acknowledges that some Utah cases suggest that decisions regarding
public funding of safety improvements are subject to immunity. But those cases are distinguishable because the claims were based on a governmental entity's failure to significantly and expensively upgrade existing facilities, and in those cases choosing to upgrade
the facilities would have considerably impacted the governmental entity's ability to
undertake other governmental activities. The classic examples are Duncan v. Union Pacific
and Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway, which involved UDOT's improvement program for railway-highway crossings. See Duncan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 842 P.2d
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832, 834 (Utah 1992); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R„ 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). Federal funding allowed eight to ten crossings to be upgraded each year, and
UDOT used a FHA-approved "hazard rating index" to determine the priority of the 1000+
crossings in Utah that lacked active warning devices. Duncan, 842 P.2d at 834. Obviously,
with limited funding available to improve the railroad crossings, the choice to improve one
particular crossing meant that another crossing would be left unimproved for another year.
Both this Court (in Gleave) and the Utah Supreme Court (in Duncan) held that UDOT's
decisions in setting priorities fell within the discretionary function exception.
Similarly, in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007, the plaintiffs
husband was killed when a thirty-foot-long irrigation pipe he was carrying contacted a
power line twenty-eight feet overhead. Id.ffif2, 24. The height of the power lines far
exceeded the applicable industry safety standards, which required only eighteen feet of
ground clearance. Id. ^ 24. The plaintiff alleged that the city was negligent in choosing not
to improve the power lines or to provide warning signs. Id. If 17. The court held that the
city would not have the discretion to build power lines that violated industry safety standards, but the city's decision not to use its limited funds to improve the lines that already
complied with those standards was protected by the discretionary function exception. Id.
fflf 25-26. Evidence in the record indicated that insulating or raising the power lines in the
city would have cost more than 128% of the city's total budget for the year the accident took
place, which would have implicated the city's ability to allocate its limited funds among all
of its responsibilities. See Laney v. Fairview City, Brief of Appellee, at 3-4. Accordingly,
the court stressed that its holding in Laney was "consistent with cases that have generally
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held that decisions balancing the need for safety improvements against limited governmental funding are entitled to discretionary function immunity." Laney at ^ 23.
In the present case, however, there is no evidence suggesting that using concrete
barriers for the Layton-Clearfield Project would have significantly impacted UDOT's
budget, prevented safety or highway improvements elsewhere, or otherwise affected
UDOT's ability to perform its governmental duties. Using barriers would have cost $50,000
more than UDOT was willing to spend, but UDOT did not show that that amount was
enough to affect its operations. In fiscal year 1995, the Legislature appropriated over $220
million to UDOT for construction, including $106 million for rehabilitation and preservation and $104 million for new construction. See 1995 Utah Laws ch. 322, § 1, Items
257-58.5

Without evidence that the additional cost would impact UDOT or its other

programs in any way, UDOT has not shown as a matter of law that the decision to omit concrete barriers was "essential" to the realization of any fundamental governmental objective.
UDOT chose to save money by increasing the risks to the driving public - its
"customers." (Much of UDOT's budget comes from the Transportation Fund, which is
funded by gasoline taxes. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-1-102, 59-13-201 et seq.) But there
was nothing "governmental" in that choice; countless private property owners, manufacturers, and business enterprises have to weigh cost versus customer safety every day.
And courts have no problem deciding that when the choice was unreasonable, and someone

D

Indeed, the contract price for the Layton-Clearfield Project alone was five million
dollars, so using the concrete barriers would have only increased the cost of that one project
by ten percent. (See UDOT-Granite Contract, R. 721 (reflecting total contract price of
$4,998,249).)
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is injured as a result, the person making that choice must answer in damages. There is no
policy-based reason why UDOT should not be held to answer for the injuries that directly
resulted from its decision.
2.

Defendant failed to establish that the decisions at issue required the
actual exercise of basic policy evaluation at the immunized policymaking level.

Additionally, UDOT failed to establish that the decision to omit concrete barriers
resulted from "the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part
of the governmental agency involved." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. To meet this element,
UDOT must show that the decisions regarding the barriers were "the result of serious and
extensive policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise," and that a "conscious balancing of
risks and advantages took place" at the "immunized policy-making level." Trujillo, 1999
UT App 227, 1HJ27, 33, 986 P.2d 752; Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667
P.2d49, 51 (Utah 1983).
The decision to omit concrete barriers was made by Dyke LeFevre, UDOTfs Region
One Director. (See LeFevre Aff., R. 712, f 13.) However, the barrels were part of the
original Traffic Control Plan that was designed by an unnamed design engineer. (See
LeFevre Depo., R. 932-35.) Mr. LeFevre testified in his affidavit that this decision was
made "in consultation with UDOT Deputy Director Clint Topham," but Mr. LeFevre
subsequently admitted in his deposition that he was "not sure I talked to him specifically
about the barrels. What I talked to him is the project is ready to go and I feel comfortable
with what's going on." (LeFevre Depo., R. 936-37.) Mr. Topham was involved only in the
decision not to accept Granite's proposed change order, and then only briefly. (Deposition
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of Clinton D. Topham, R. 1068.) In fact, LeFevre said that Topham left the decision up to
LeFevre, to be decided based on costs. (See LeFevre Depo. at 938-39.)
The evidence UDOT submitted is not sufficient to establish that Mr. LeFevre's
decision required the actual exercise of "basic policy evaluation" or that the decision was
made by someone "at the immunized policy-making level." First, regarding basic policy
evaluation, Mr. Johnson has already shown that the decision to omit concrete barriers could
not have been justified by any basic governmental policies, other than a desire to save some
money. All non-cost issues such as safety, traffic congestion, and length of construction
time weighed in favor of concrete barriers, because using barriers would have resulted in a
safer project that would have been completed sooner and allowed more lanes to remain
open at all times. Once again, this case is a far cry from Keegan, in which the UDOT
. commissioned two specific studies and circulated them throughout the department.
Regardless of what Mr. LeFevre claims after the fact, a jury could easily infer that Mr.
LeFevre did not actually consider any of these fundamental policy factors in deciding to
forego concrete barriers.6
Second, UDOT did not establish as a matter of law that Mr. LeFevre acted at the
"immunized, policy-making level." UDOT claims that Mr. LeFevre was "personally in

6

Additionally, it would be improper to grant (or uphold) summary judgment relying,
or too heavily, on Mr. LeFevre's uncorroborated affidavit testimony about his own thought
processes. Such testimony falls within the rule that when a party's own state of mind is
dispositive, that party cannot automatically obtain summary judgment simply by signing an
affidavit. See, e.g., Croley v. Matson Nav. Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The court
should be cautious in granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the
dispositive issue requires a determination of state of mind."). See generally, 10B Wright,
Miller & Kane, Federal Prac. & Proc: Civil 3d § 2730 (1998).
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charge of all transportation-related matters for [Region One]," but there is nothing indicating that Mr. LeFevre was responsible for deciding matters of policy. (See LeFevre Aff.
ffl[ 3-4, R. 710.) Mr. LeFevre was an engineer, not a policy-maker. In fact, the Utah Code
states that the region director's job is to Mexecut[e] department policy within the region," not
decide it. Utah Code Ann. § 72-l-205(3)(a) (emphasis added). Mr. LeFevre testified in his
deposition that there was nothing special about the decisions he made regarding the LaytonClearfield Project; those decisions were no different than the types of decisions he made
every day. (LeFevre Depo., R. 941-42.)
Once again, the discretionary function exception is designed to protect the process of
governing - of making choices between competing policies that affect the government's
citizens. All UDOT has shown is that making the project safer would have cost some extra
money, but if this were enough to shield a governmental entity from liability, then the Act
itself would be meaningless, because every negligent act would be "discretionary" and
therefore immunized from liability.

UDOT has not shown that any significant

"governmental" factors or policies were involved in deciding not to spend the money —
instead, UDOT simply chose not to spend additional money to provide a safer product for
its customers. UDOT is not immune from liability for the consequences of its choice.
CONCLUSION
UDOT has a nondelegable duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that Utah's state
highways, including Interstate 15, are reasonably safe. This duty does not go away when
the road is under construction, nor does it go away when UDOT chooses to have a third
party, instead of its own crews, work on the road. Further, the discretionary function
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exception does not automatically immunize every decision by a governmental entity to save
money by foregoing safety.

Plaintiff/Appellant Craig Johnson therefore respectfully

requests that the Court reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand the matter
to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED:

December jv , 2003.
GRIDLEY WARD & SHAW
Erik M. Ward
Lindy W. Van Dyke
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

$A.

***-

Stephen P. Horvat
Attorneys for Appellant Craig Johnson
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day of December, 2003, I caused two true and

correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be served via first class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Scott W. Christensen
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen J. Trayner
STRONG & HANNI
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS
1.

Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal With Prejudice, R. 1157-60.

2.

Photographs, R. 910-12.

3.

Traffic Control Plan Diagrams, R. 900, 951.

4.

FHA Guidelines for Mitigating Pavement Dropoffs in Construction and
Maintenance Work Zones, R. 957-58.

5.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965).

6.

Restatement (Second) of Torts §418(1965).
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layton District Court

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
CRAIG JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, GRANITE
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF UTAH,
dba GIBBONS & REED COMPANY,
JOHN DOES l-V,
Defendants.

ORDER OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

Civil No. 970700411
Judge Thomas L. Kay

The above entitled matter came before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay on the 1S
day of November, 2002, for hearing on defendant Utah Department of Transportation's
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney H. Scott Jacobson appeared for
defendant UDOT, attorneys Erik M. Ward and Christopher L. Shaw appeared for plaintiff

Craig Johnson, and attorney Scott W. Christensen appeared for defendant Granite
Construction. The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file herein, and having heard
the arguments of counsel for UDOT and plaintiff, and being otherwise fully apprised in the
premises, now enters the following:
FINDINGS A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
1.

There are no genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary

judgment on plaintiffs claims against UDOT. Specifically, the Court finds that Facts 1 -20
on pages 1 -4 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment
do not conform with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, and therefore, those facts do not dispute UDOTs Statement of Facts.
While plaintiffs response to UDOT Facts 3, 5, 6, 20, 2 1 , 22, 23, 24, and 26, found on
pages 5-8 of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment,
does conform with Rule 4-501, plaintiffs response to those facts does not establish any
genuine issues of fact which would preclude summary judgment.
2.

For the reasons stated in UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment and

supporting memoranda, and for the reasons stated by UDOT's counsel during the
November 13, 2002 orai arguments, plaintiffs claims against UDOT must fail as a matter
of law.
3.

The decisions made by UDOT Region One Director Dyke LeFevre

surrounding the use of plastic barrels rather than concrete barriers on the Layton2

Clearfield Project were decisions made at the policy-making level, and were immune from
liability under the discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1); see also Keeqan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah
1995).
4.

Although plaintiff still has separate claims pending against co-defendant

Granite Construction, there is no reason to delay the entry of final judgment on plaintiffs
claims against UDOT.
5.

In order to avoid the possibility of multiple trials, the remaining claims

between plaintiff and Granite Construction should be stayed pending the resolution of any
appeal by plaintiff of the claims against UDOT.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

That UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2.

That all of plaintiffs claims against UDOT are DISMISSED with prejudice.

3.

That UDOT shall be awarded costs as prevailing party under Rule 54(d)(1)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be established by affidavit, with
interest to accrue at the rate provided for by law.
4.

That this Judgment shall be certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule

54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3

5.

That the remaining claims between plaintiff and Granite Construction shall

be stayed pending the resolution of any appeal of the dismissal of the claims against
UDOT.

DATED this

day of _

7
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE THOMtfS L KAY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

*&

Christopher L^Shaw
Attorney for Plaintiff
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Scott W. Christensen
Attorney for Granite Construction

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \5? day of December, 2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE was sent via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Erik M. Ward, Esq.
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS
635 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
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Washington, P. C. 20590
Guidelines for Mitigating Pavenent Dropoffs
in Construction and Maintenance Work Zones-

QM

Chief, Construction and Maintenance Division
Office of Highway Operations

AHTO?

OEC I

1986

. KHQ*31

Regional Federal Highway Administrators
Regions 1-10
Direct Federal ProgrsR Administrator
One of the problems noted during our 1986 construction reviews and work
zone safety reviews involves pavement dropoffs adjacent to construction and
maintenance activities. These dropoffs include, those created by pavenent or
bridge deck removal work, shoulder excavations, and the placement of new
layers of pav.ement. When not properly addressed, dropoffs may lead to an
errant vehicle losing control resulting in property damage, injury, and
possibly death. It was found that many States do'not have any policy or
guidelines addressing this hazardous situation/ With the growing nunber
of 3R/AR projects, there is potential for. dropoff incidents to increase
significantly.
To address this concern, information has been compiled and used to develop
steps to mitigate potentially hazardous dropoffs* These suggested procedures
are based on findings from recent research, current policies and guidelines
frafl a nimoer of States, and consideration of construction operations* The
information presented here is not intended in any way to represent policy or
to serve as a directive of the FHJrfA, nor does 1t represent or promulgate any
new standard. Instead, this information 1s to provide guidelines to States
in the development of their own dropoff policy.
Any dropoff is considered hazardous, but those greater than 2 inches, left
overnight, and immediately adjacent to traffic have a high accident potential.
For such situations, ont or a combination of the following m1tig4t1ng measures
is recommended;
1. Specify that the contractor schedule resurfacing or construction
operations such that no dropoff is left unprotected overnight, or,
as a minimun, limit the length of the dropoff and the period of
exposure.
2.

If feasible, place steel plates to cover an excavation or trench.
A wedge of material around the cover may be required in order to
assure a smooth transition between the pavsnent and the plate*
Warning $1ons should be used to alert motorists of the presence
of steel plates particularly when the plates are on the travel
lanes.

2
3. Place a wedge of material along the face of the dropoff. The wedge
should consist of stable material placed at a 3:1 or flatter slope.
Warning signs may be needed 1n advance and throughout the treatment.
Payment markings or markers are useful in delineating the edge of
the travel lane.
4. Place channelizing devices along the traffic side of the hazard and
maintain a 3-foot wide buffer between the edge of the travel lane and
the dropoff. The minima spacing of the devices in feet should be, at
most, twice the speed in miles per hour. Oropoff warning signs should
be placed 1n advance and throughout the dropoff treatment.
5.

Install portable concrete barriers or other acceptable positive barriers
with a 2-foot buffer between the barrier face and the traveled way.
An acceptable crashworthy terminal or flared barriers are required at
the upstream end of the section. For nighttime use, the barriers must
be supplemented by standard delineation devices, i.e., paint,
retroreflectlve tape, markers, or warning lights.

For dropoffs greater than 5 inches, recommendation 5 fs strongly suggested
if recommendations 1 or 2 are not feasible. Speed reduction measures need
to be considered particularly for recommendations 4 and 5, Although these
mitigating measures are directed to nighttime conditions, dropoffs must also
be properly addressed during daylight operations*
we recognize that there may be so*e reluctance by the States to develop a
dropoff policy or guidelines. The .primary concern that has been stated in
the past is that the development of such a policy would increase the
potential for tort liability actions. It has however also ittn stated that
the existance of properly developed policies and conformance to those
policies can in fact provide the. State with a good defense against tort
liability. More Important however, is that such policies will provide
greater protection from accidents and injuries for the motorist.
We strongly encourage you to work with the States on the development of such
policies. If any further information or technical assistance 1s-.needed,
please contact us at your convenience.

$*v, K b B. Myers
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EMPLOYERS OF CONTRACTORS

§ 4^4

work to be done is to be taken into account; and an inexperienced
widow employing a contractor to build a house is not to be expected to have the same information, or to make the same inquiries, as to whether the work to be done is likely to create
a peculiar risk of physical harm to others, or to require special
precautions, as is a real estate development company employing
a contractor to build the same house.
§ 4 1 4 . Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor,
but who retains the control of any part of the work, is
subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose
safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable
care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. If the employer of an independent contractor retains
control over the operative detail of doing any part of the work,
he is subject to liability for the negligence of the employees of
the contractor engaged therein, under the rules of that part of
the law of Agency which deals with the relation of master and
servant. The employer may, however, retain a control less than
that which is necessary to subject him to liability as master.
He may retain only the power to direct the order in which the
work shall be done, or to forbid its being done in a manner likely
to be dangerous to himself or others. Such a supervisory control may not subject him to liability under the principles of
Agency, but he may be liable under the rule stated in this Section
unless he exercises his supervisory control with reasonable care
so as to prevent the work which he has ordered to be done from
causing injury to others.
b. The rule stated in this Section is usually, though not exclusively, applicable when a principal contractor entrusts a part
of the work to subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman
superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the principal
contractor is subject to liability if he fails to prevent the subcontractors from doing even the details of the work in a way unreasonably dangerous to others, if he knows or by the exerSee Appendix for Reporter^ Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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cise of reasonable care should know that the subcontractors'
work is being so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it
by exercising the power of control which he has retained in
himself. So too, he is subject to liability if he knows or should
know that the subcontractors have carelessly done their work in
such a way as to create a dangerous condition, and fails to exercise reasonable care either to remedy it himself or by the exercise of his control cause the subcontractor to do so.
e. In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply,
the employer must have retained at least some degree of control
over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that
he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be
followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not
mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work,
or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a
right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do
the work in his own way.
§ 4 1 4 A . Duty of Possessor of Land to Prevent Activities
and Conditions Dangerous to Those Outside of
Land
A possessor of land who has employed or permitted an
independent contractor to do work on the land, and
knows or has reason to know that the activities of the
contractor or conditions created by him involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to those outside of
the land, is subject to liability to them for such harm if
he fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against it.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is a special application of
the general rule stated in § 318, as to the duty of a possessor to
exercise reasonable care to control the activities of any third
person using the land. See also § 364, as to conditions on the
land created by third persons. The rule stated here usually is
applied in cases of public or private nuisance arising out of activities of the contractor, or out of conditions which he has
See Appendix for Reporter s Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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§ 4 1 8 . Maintenance of Public Highways and Other Public
Places
(1) One who is under a duty to construct or maintain
a highway in reasonably safe condition for the use of the
public, and who entrusts its construction, maintenance,
or repair to an independent contractor, is subject to the
same liability for physical harm to persons using the
highway while it is held open for travel during such
work, caused by the negligent failure of the contractor
to make it reasonably safe for travel, as though the employer had retained the work in his own hands.
(2) The statement in Subsection (1) applies to any place
which is maintained by a government for the use of
the public, if the government is under the same duty to
maintain it in reasonably safe condition as it owes to the
public in respect to the condition of its highways.
See Reporter's Notes.
Comment:
a. The rules stated in this Section apply only to harm suffered as a result of the dangerous condition of the highway or
other public place, as distinguished from harm caused by the
activities of the contractor.
Comment on Subsection ( 1 ) :
b. The rule stated in this Subsection is usually applicable
to impose liability upon a municipality which at common law or
by statute is under a duty to maintain its highways in reasonably
safe condition for public travel. It also applies to corporations
which maintain toll roads or bridges for public travel under a
franchise.
The rule may also apply to a contractor who undertakes to
repair, construct, or maintain a highway, and entrusts the work
to a subcontractor; or to one who is permitted, for his own purposes, to disturb a highway and undertakes to restore it to safe
condition. It may apply to the State, where the State owes such
a duty to the public, and is not immune from suit. The duty
to construct, maintain, or repair the highway may be statutory, or
contractual, or merely exist at common law.
c. Nothing in this Section is intended in any way to affect any immunity which the State, a municipality, or other govSee Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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ernment may have from liability. The rule stated here applies
only where there is no such immunity.
d. In the case of a public highway, the liability extends
only to harm received while the highway is held open for travel
and does not impose liability for harm received by persons traveling upon a road closed to public travel, upon which an adequate
notice has been given to the effect that the road is closed. This
is not to say, however, that notice is conclusive of the question whether the road is closed; for example, it may be that
by acquiescing in public use of a road it is in fact held open
despite notices to the contrary.
e. The liability for physical harm caused by the negligence
of the contractor in failing to put or maintain the highway in
safe condition is the same as though the employer were doing
the work of construction, maintenance, or repair himself. If
the harm is caused by the dangerous condition of the highway
held open by a municipality for public travel, the right of action
by the person harmed against the municipality is subject to the
same limitations and conditions and must be enforced by the
same procedure as though the municipality were itself doing the
work which it entrusted to the contractor.
Comment on Subsection (2):
/. The statement in this Subsection applies to determine
the liability of a government which employs an independent contractor to do work in a public park or building maintained by
it, which work is necessary to put or maintain the park or building in reasonably safe condition for the use of the public, if the
government is, in the particular jurisdiction in which the park
is situated, under the same duty to maintain its parks and public buildings in reasonably safe condition for the use of the public
as it is under to maintain its highways in reasonably safe condition for public travel.
g. Comments b, c, and e on Subsection (1) are applicable to Subsection (2).
§ 4 1 9 . Repairs Which Lessor is Under a Duty to His Lessee
to Make
A lessor of land who employs an independent contractor
to perform a duty which the lessor owes to his lessee
to maintain the leased land in reasonably safe condiSee Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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